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Abstract 
This article discusses the normative perspectives that guide debates on freedom of 
communication and media from the perspective of the distinction between ideal and non-
ideal theory. In political theory, ideal theories are often criticized as being detached from 
actually existing social conditions and real-world problems. Similarly, it can be argued that 
abstract and idealized models of freedom of communication and media do not provide the 
most useful theoretical resources for analyzing the factors that enable or constrain free 
expression in contemporary societies. The article discusses the implication of three different 
non-ideal approaches to freedom: Axel Honneth’s normative reconstruction, the capabilities 
approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and the notion of agonistic 
freedom associated with radical-democratic theory. 
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 Freedom Without Idealization: Non-Ideal Approaches to Freedom of Communication 
 
In the debate on the roles of ideal and non-ideal theory in contemporary political 
theory, it has been suggested that abstract ideals of societal perfection may not always 
provide the most useful conceptual basis for normative theory and critical research (e.g., 
Mills, 2005; Stemplowska & Swift, 2012). Ideal theories about notions, such as freedom, 
justice, or democracy, in particular have been widely criticized for being too abstract and 
detached from actually existing empirical conditions to guide normative analyses or political 
action in real-world circumstances. Instead, these critics have argued that there is a need for 
non-ideal normative theories that can better address actual problems and guide political 
choices. 
The same kind of criticism can be directed at current academic and political debates 
on freedom as a central normative concept in the context of communication and media. There 
is no shortage of discussion and disagreement on the different meanings of freedom of 
expression, communication, and media, or the institutional implications of these ideals. 
However, the normative conceptions of freedom that underpin these debates are often highly 
abstract and idealized, to the extent of being vacuous, in the sense that they provide little 
guidance for actually analyzing and evaluating media systems, performance, or concrete 
media policy choices.  
Instead, it can be argued that ideal-theoretical frameworks of free expression and 
media freedom often serve the function of normative reassurance: justifying their status as 
universal abstract principles or defending pre-determined policy positions, rather than 
actually providing resources for analyzing how these principles have emerged and evolved, 
or how actually existing structures and practices enable or constrain their realization. 
 What I mean by “idealized” conceptions of freedom thus refers both to the way of 
thinking about freedom of communication as an absolute or authentic ideal, detached from 
empirical conditions, and to the uses of such absolute ideals in public and policy debates as 
“fetishized principles” to gather support for a variety of agendas (see Freedman, 2015, p. 
104). 
Especially in political debates on the media, but also in research, the status of freedom 
as a foundational ideal is often simply taken for granted, which leaves questions of normative 
assumptions unexamined. At other times, when different normative frameworks of freedom 
are explicitly invoked, they typically presuppose a classic ideal theory developed in a context 
very different from the current conditions. Despite the recognition of the decidedly non-ideal 
circumstances surrounding the contemporary media landscape, the debates tend to be 
couched in ideal frameworks of the free marketplace of ideas, the public sphere, or some 
other established model or metaphor of what communicative freedom would mean under 
idealized, hypothetical conditions. 
According to Edge (2013, p. 379), a normative theory of freedom should enable us to 
evaluate “the way the (alterable) shapes and structures of our societies affect the shape of our 
freedom, and how our areas, or degrees, of individual liberty are distributed and, indeed, what 
kind of obstacles might be standing in the way of our actual and potential choices.” The 
debates on freedom of communication and media freedom in contemporary societies clearly 
touch upon concrete real-world problems that involve complex, evolving obstacles and power 
structures. In terms of understanding and critically evaluating these constraints or making 
comparisons between different non-ideal cases, relating these conditions to abstract and 
timeless idealizations of pure and perfect freedom is arguably not the most useful approach. 
The idealized way of thinking about freedom as a state of perfection also offers little practical 
policy guidance: Invoking free speech as an absolute principle may well help compel political 
 support for the actors and causes that deploy them, but for the purposes of critically 
evaluating obstacles to communication, different policy options and their consequences, it 
may sometimes be counter-productive. As many critical scholars have noted, such ritualistic 
uses risk reducing terms such as free speech, press freedom, or internet freedom to mere 
fetishized principles or “tired, incoherent mantras” (Freedman, 2015; Tambini, 2012). With 
enduring and emerging constraints ranging from government control and market censorship 
to new forms of platform dominance and algorithmic censorship, normative and media policy 
choices related to freedom of communication arguably need better theoretical and normative 
grounding. 
The aim of this article is to examine and compare three distinct normative 
perspectives, which approach freedom of communication and media in non-ideal and non-
foundational terms. These approaches recognize freedom as a contested, imperfect, and 
socially constructed ideal, not a state that can be attained in any absolute sense. However, the 
idea is not to replace ideal theories with relativism or descriptivism, or to argue for accepting 
the status quo as a given. The non-idealizing perspectives discussed here retain freedom of 
communication as a central normative principle, but without binding it to any transcendental, 
universal ideal theory with definite conditions of realization. While they are not without 
problems, I argue that the three approaches discussed below can, in different ways, provide 
useful theoretical perspectives for rethinking freedom of communication as a normative 
concept and for evaluating the structures and practices that enable or constrain it today. 
The article begins with a brief introduction to the philosophical distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theory. The implications of the distinction in the context of current 
debates on freedom of communication and media are then discussed. After that, the article 
present three different theoretical perspectives on freedom that have arguably been, if not 
neglected, at least underdeveloped in normative debates in communication studies: Axel 
 Honneth’s (2014) approach of normative reconstruction, the capabilities approach developed 
by Amartya Sen (2009) and Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2011), and the radical-democratic idea 
of agonistic freedom (Kioupkiolis, 2008, 2009, 2012). After introducing these frameworks, 
the article discusses the implications of each for thinking about freedom of communication 
and media. 
 
Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory 
The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, originally drawn by John Rawls 
in A Theory of Justice (1971/1999), has recently resurfaced in philosophical debates on the 
proper methods and aims of normative political theory. While there are different ways of 
understanding the distinction, the term “ideal” is generally understood through its 
connotations of perfection, but also of impossibility (idealism contrasted with realism). Ideal 
theory therefore typically refers to a utopian or idealistic theory that focuses on abstract 
principles or the hypothetical end-state, whereas non-ideal theory is seen as more realistic, 
and focused on transitional improvements in various real-life contexts (Valentini, 2012). In 
brief, the debate thus concerns the question of whether normative political theories should 
primarily aim to identify ideal visions or models of “societal perfection” or focus more on 
gradual improvements or comparisons that can guide practical political action without 
necessarily determining what the optimum is (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012). 
Ideal theories typically involve idealized assumptions, seeking to identify principles 
that would guide political or social arrangements under favorable conditions, regardless of 
whether these principles can realistically be applied. Proponents of non-ideal theory, in 
contrast, tend to emphasize how political theory ought to account for the actual functioning of 
society and offer normative guidance for political action here and now in empirically 
 contingent circumstances. Non-ideal theory thus focuses more on how values and ideals are 
translated into actual social mechanisms, institutions, and practices. 
As the starting point for these debates, Rawls originally presented ideal theory as the 
first step of normative theory, a necessary precursor that sets a long-term target and a 
normative reference point for the kind of non-ideal theory that can subsequently guide action 
in the real world, under actually existing, imperfect circumstances. As Rawls (1971/1999, pp. 
89–90) put it, “until the ideal is identified, at least in outline […] non-ideal theory lacks an 
objective, an aim, by reference to which its queries can be answered”. According to this view, 
the priority for normative theory is therefore to figure out the principles that would 
characterize society under ideal circumstances, and only at the second stage to reflect on the 
way in which principles can be brought to bear on political practices and institutions. 
Rawls’s theory of justice is often cited as a classic example of ideal theory, but in the 
context of media and communications, there are several other theoretical traditions that have 
sought to establish communicative freedom as an ideal normative reference point in this 
sense. Prominent ideal models include, for example, classical liberal theories of how freedom 
of expression enables the discovery of truth and self-development (e.g., Mill, 1859/1948) or 
more contemporary theories of deliberative democracy, discourse ethics, and the public 
sphere (e.g., Habermas, 1962/1989, 1992/1996). The purpose here is not to review or criticize 
these theories here. Habermas’s work, for example, ranges from historical sociology to moral 
philosophy, and involves many different ways of constructing and employing ideals. The 
point is that often these ideals are removed from their original contexts to be deployed as 
abstract normative reference points or ideal blueprints in debates about the organization of 
media institutions. 
The emphasis on ideal theory in political philosophy has been criticized from many 
directions, including conservatives, radical-democrats, postmodern theorists, feminists, and 
 many others (Mills, 2005; Schwartzman, 2006; Stemplowska & Swift, 2012). While critics 
may have different understandings of ideal theory and different reasons for their critiques, 
they signal a common concern that ideal normative theories are too detached from reality to 
guide political analysis or action in actually existing circumstances. 
In contrast to Rawls, many critics of ideal theory argue that non-ideal theory cannot 
be relegated to second-order questions of how to “apply” ideals to practice (Wilson & Ryg, 
2015). Instead, it is argued that, to be useful, normative theory should begin from the non-
ideal real-world circumstances, and draw on the existing social science evidence 
documenting specific conditions and problems. In the context of media and communication, 
for example, this would involve starting from specific circumstances of contemporary media 
systems and their legal, institutional, and cultural contexts, and developing normative targets 
on the basis of existing problems rather than superimposing a universal and abstract ideal of 
freedom on these contexts. 
Philosopher Axel Honneth (2014, p. 1) has recently argued: “one of the major 
weaknesses of contemporary political philosophy is that is has been decoupled from an 
analysis of society and has thus become fixated on purely normative principles […] drawn up 
in isolation from the norms that prevail in given practices and institutions”.  
Similarly, economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (2009) claims that the 
characterization of spotless justice, or knowing what an identifiably perfect alternative would 
look like in principle, is simply not necessary or even helpful for the purpose of judging what 
is required here and now. For Sen, what is needed instead is a comparative approach, which 
allows the comparison of the relative merits of different options, rather than 
a transcendental approach, which assesses these in the light of certain ideal principles, 
conceived under idealized assumptions. 
 In all, ideal theory and its abstract normative principles are often seen as insensitive to 
empirical realities and social-scientific analyses of how cultural, economic, and political 
institutions actually work. Even worse, it has sometimes been argued that ideal theories can 
be ideological and counter-productive, because by focusing on abstract ideals, they distract 
attention from actually existing injustices and forms of oppression (Mills, 2005; Stemplowska 
& Swift, 2012, p. 377). 
A comprehensive discussion of the different meanings of ideal and non-ideal theory in 
philosophy, and the arguments about their merits and flaws, is beyond the scope of this 
article. The distinction presented here is stylized, and, in practice, many normative 
approaches combine features of both ideal and non-ideal theory (e.g., Stemplowska, 2008). 
However, I use the distinction and the criticism of ideal theory here as a lens through which I 
examine current debates on freedom of communication and media. Are the abstract, idealized 
notions of free speech and media freedom invoked in academic and political debates actually 
counter-productive for the purposes of critical research in the current landscape of imperfect 
and partial media freedom? And what would non-ideal theoretical approaches to freedom 
entail in the context of media and communications? 
 
Idealizations of Free Communication 
It can be argued that the concept of freedom serves a paradigmatic normative function 
in debates on the role of media and communications in society: As an abstract ideal, it 
functions not only as a normative benchmark for evaluating media systems, institutions, and 
practices, but also as an overarching framework that structures intellectual orientation and 
overall thinking about the role of media institutions in society (e.g., Frega, 2017; 
Nordestreng, 2013). 
 Within this normative paradigm, there are different interpretations, or theories, of 
what freedom in the context of media and communications means and how it can be realized. 
It is common, for example, to distinguish between negative (freedom from) and positive 
(freedom to) conceptions of freedom, and their different implications for thinking about the 
relationship between media, the state, and society. Abstraction and idealization are not 
specific to any one type of theory, however, and both negative and positive approaches to 
communicative freedom can rely on ideals of authentic or absolute freedom, conceived under 
certain idealized assumptions. 
In normative political theory, idealization generally refers to contra-factual 
assumptions that agents or conditions have certain ideal qualities. According to Rawls’s 
(1971/1999, p. 216) original use, ideal theory makes two types of idealizing assumptions. 
First, it assumes that all actors are generally willing to comply with whatever principles are 
chosen. In the case of free speech, this can involve for example assumptions that individuals 
are generally truth-seeking, rational and well-informed. Secondly, ideal theory assumes 
favorable social conditions: for example, that there are no major economic, social, or 
educational inequalities, which inhibit people from voicing their opinions and taking part in 
public speech. According to Mills’ (2005, p. 168–169) critical reading, typical assumptions 
can also include an idealized social ontology of equal and atomic individuals, unrealistic 
capacities attributed to individuals, and silence on oppression and structural domination.  
Both negative and positive conceptions of free expression can contain such 
assumptions: Libertarian, negative conceptions of free speech typically tend to assume that 
free speech exists when the state does not directly restrict it (e.g., Kenyon, 2014). The 
metaphor of the free marketplace of ideas, in which the truth emerges as the result of open 
discussions occurring without any threat of censorship or governmental interference, is 
obviously idealizing in the sense that it ignores the real circumstances that obstruct the use of 
 public speech, such as market failures, self-censorship, and other psychological and 
ideological constraints. In line with Mills’ (2005) criticism of ideal theory, negative 
libertarians thus tend to abstract freedom from social power, ignoring how real-world 
conditions and existing structures prevent people from using their freedom.  
On the other hand, many positive conceptions of freedom, or notions of positive 
communication rights, can also be criticized for trying to develop a pre-determined lists of 
abstract, universal preconditions or specific ends that “authentic” communicative freedom 
would involve. In line with Berlin’s (1969) famous discussion, positive freedom can be 
criticized for paternalism or essentialism, trying to define the communicative needs and rights 
of citizens from above. Proponents of positive freedom, who draw on the Habermasian or 
Kantian ideas of rational autonomy and self-mastery, for example, can be criticized for 
associating freedom with a permanent essence, based on invariant principles and 
predetermined laws based on ideal theories of universal reason (see Kioupkiolis, 2009). 
The idealizing assumptions of both liberal theories of the free marketplace of ideas 
and theories of the public sphere have of course been extensively criticized and revised. 
Assumptions of rationality and the “bracketing” of existing inequalities, for example, are 
much discussed criticisms of the Habermasian theories of the public sphere and deliberative 
democracy (e.g., Fraser, 1992). Regardless, and in the absence of better alternatives, ideals 
and normative metaphors derived from these theories still retain their status as normative 
reference points in much of the debate on free communication and media. 
Freedom is not only a philosophical ideal, but also a political catchword whose 
rhetorical appeal can be used for a variety of purposes. Therefore, if the ideals of freedom 
that underlie current debates on media often appear divorced from the actual empirical 
realities of contemporary media systems and concrete media policy concerns, the reasons are 
not only philosophical but also political and practical. Public and political debates are rarely 
 premised on clearly articulated ideal theories. As a normative paradigm, discourses of 
freedom involve metaphors and myths that involve idealization and abstraction in a different 
sense from Rawlsian ideal theory. The use of freedom as a politically sacrosanct but often 
vacuous principle underscores the point that abstract ideals and principles can distract 
attention from actually existing real-world problems. 
In contemporary media policy, many critical scholars have noted how idealized 
notions of freedom, and the normative appeal they offer, are often mobilized by those in 
power to block reforms and close down debate. In the debates on media accountability and 
press self-regulation in the UK, for example, newspapers have successfully invoked the value 
of “press freedom” as an absolute and inviolable right to oppose any oversight, without 
needing to define the concept or to provide any arguments of how the proposed measures 
would actually restrain journalism or reduce their freedoms (Freedman, 2015; Tambini, 
2012). Similarly, in the US, corporations have strategically harnessed the principle of “free 
speech” to resist regulations and expand protections of commercial speech (Weiland, 2017). 
In the context of internet governance, it has been claimed that the naïve promotion of 
“internet freedom” often ignores real power relations and restrictions online (Morozov, 
2011). 
Consequently, the aim of finding alternative, non-ideal perspectives on 
communicative freedom is not only of theoretical interest but is also politically relevant. But 
what should a non-ideal, non-foundational approach to freedom of communicative then look 
like? In debates on ideal and non-ideal theory in political theory, the criticisms of ideal theory 
as detached from actual empirical circumstances is often translated into a call for more focus 
on policies and institutions instead of abstract principles (Stemplowska & Swift, 2012, p. 
387). In the field of media and communication studies, however, there is no shortage of 
practice-oriented research on media policy and regulation, media use, journalistic institutions 
 and technological changes, among other areas. In many of these studies, the focus is on 
solving practical problems and the ideal of communicative freedom as a normative ideal is 
taken for granted without much further problematizing. Empirical comparisons of media 
freedom across countries (e.g., Freedom House, 2017), for example, are typically very 
focused on concrete policies and institutional developments, but lack engagement with 
normative theory or concepts. As such, they can be criticized for presupposing a hegemonic 
conception of media freedom as a fixed, universal ideal. Instead of being detached from real 
functioning of actual institutions, media and communication studies is often criticized for 
underdeveloped theoretical resources and lack of engagement with broader political and 
social theory (e.g., Hesmondhalgh & Toynbee, 2008; Karppinen, 2013). 
Thus the problem addressed in this article is not a lack of focus on policies and 
institutions, but the limited range of theoretical frameworks used in these debates. What I 
argue here is that there is a need for another type of normative theorizing in communication 
studies, between abstract ideal models and mere empirical descriptivism, which can function 
as a conceptual resource for evaluating, identifying, and pushing up against different ways in 
which actually existing institutions, policies and circumstances enable or constrain freedom 
of communication. To this end, I examine three, arguably under-developed theoretical 
frameworks, which in different ways can provide a basis for non-ideal theorizing of 
communicative freedom. 
 
Three Non-Ideal Approaches 
The theoretical approaches discussed here represent mutually divergent traditions, but 
share the idea of freedom as a historical and contested ideal, and a matter of degree, not as a 
fixed universal absolute. As such, these approaches are arguably more attuned to considering 
the specific circumstances that foster or constrain communicative freedom, instead of trying 
 to imagine universal, definite conditions for its realization. After briefly introducing each of 
the approaches, I discuss their implications for academic and policy debates on 
communicative freedom and how they may be useful for communication studies. 
 
Normative Reconstruction and Social Freedom 
In his book Freedom’s Right (2014), philosopher Axel Honneth offers a sharp 
criticism of the mainstream of political philosophy and, in particular, theories of freedom and 
rights. Instead of the abstract, formal, and procedural principles of Kantian and Neo-Kantian 
political theory, represented by theorists like Rawls and Habermas, he draws on Hegel’s 
philosophy to propose a form of critical social theory that he calls “normative reconstruction” 
and his own conception of “social freedom.” 
Normative reconstruction, according to Honneth (2014), is a procedure that aims to 
develop normative theory by identifying and reworking the norms and ideals already inherent 
in modern institutions, and then evaluating them through normative comparison. Instead of 
“free-standing constructions” derived from purely normative principles prior to immanent 
analysis, Honneth (2014, pp. 4–6) argues that critical political theory should derive its ideals 
from the normative claims that have developed within actual social, economic, and political 
practices and institutions. After identifying these already existing normative commitments 
and problems, normative reconstruction then proceeds to evaluate these “institutional 
promises of freedom” and “claims that have not yet been redeemed” by analyzing the trends 
and possibilities inherent in existing social reality (Honneth, 2014, p. viii). This does not 
imply taking the existing institutions and the status quo as given, but involves criticizing 
existing conditions which fail to actualize their potential to realize these values fully. 
Other theorists have proposed similar strategies. The method of normative 
reconstruction is paralleled, for example, by John Dewey’s pragmatic idea of starting inquiry 
 from “lived experience” and subsequently directing the reworked ideals back into practice to 
guide subsequent action and knowledge (Wilson & Ryg, 2015, p. 132). In this way, a 
normative ideal, such as freedom, would not represent a purely abstract principle or an 
external end superimposed on social reality, but an ideal that emerges from inquiry into 
existing social values and human practices, on the one hand, and critical evaluation of the 
existing ideals’ normative validity and rationality on the other.  
According to Honneth, the normative validity of values and social aims can only be 
evaluated after understanding how they emerge within a social context. This involves making 
visible how values do not emerge from thin air but evolve and get re-interpreted in different 
institutional and practical contexts. By picking up on values and ideas already 
institutionalized in society and evaluating their moral validity through normative comparison, 
Honneth (2014, p. 63) thus aims to address actual social, economic, and political practices 
and institutions in a way that abstract ideal theories fail to do. 
Regarding the norm of freedom, in particular, Honneth uses the method of normative 
reconstruction to develop a three-way taxonomy of the modern concept of freedom by 
distinguishing between negative, reflexive (positive), and social freedom.  
Critical of the abstract, procedural conceptions of freedom promoted by liberal 
theorists like Locke and Mill, but also contemporary theorists like Rawls and Habermas, 
Honneth argues that in both idealized negative and reflexive notions of freedom, freedom is 
detached from the institutionalized settings and the structural preconditions actually existing 
in society. Honneth thus rejects the atomistic and procedural idea of freedom, abstracted from 
social reality and existing constraints, and instead argues that social conditions should be a 
constitutive part of freedom itself. For him, this means taking into account the actual 
institutional settings and social relations within which people communicate. Freedom is thus 
not seen as an abstract, transcendental ideal, but a practical achievement that can only be 
 realized socially, within institutions and practices, and in relation to other people. “Social 
freedom” is therefore not only an individual right, but a social condition that involves mutual 
recognition and acting together so that “individuals’ intentions are ‘interlaced’ in a way that 
constitutes a form of cooperation” (Honneth, 2014, p. 125).  
Honneth’s previous work on recognition has occasionally been noted in 
communication studies, for instance by Couldry (2010) in his discussion of the concept of 
voice as a normative value. At least in comparison to Habermas, however, broader 
engagement with Honneth’s ideas of social freedom and the method of normative 
reconstruction in communication studies has been limited and its full implications for 
thinking about freedom of communication and expression have not yet been fully developed. 
The approach has a number of potentially attractive implications for thinking about 
freedom of communication and media. First, the call to work with existing values and norms, 
instead of purely abstract normative principles, implies that a precise institutional blueprint 
for “free” media systems cannot be generated from abstract principles that precede social 
analysis. Instead, debates should start from actually existing values developed within civil 
society and communicative institutions, and their immanent criticism and comparison. 
Besides laws, this could mean taking into account existing conceptions of freedom in 
journalism, politics, the expectations of the public and the demands of civil society, and 
evaluating their validity, mutual cohesion, and conditions of realization. In this sense, the 
ideals of journalistic freedom or internet freedom, for instance, would not represent 
embodiments of a higher abstract principle, assumed from above, but contextual, historical 
norms developed from below. Through normative reconstruction, research would need to 
assess how actors justify and ground these values, and what limits and constraints they 
involve in current institutions and practices. 
 In this way, the approach of normative reconstruction seems to avoid the problem of 
superimposing abstract, free-standing principles of free speech or media freedom on current 
institutions and practices and evaluating how they measure up against these abstract ideals. 
Instead, the approach would start by analyzing what people actually think about the 
relationship between the media, state, and economy, and after such an immanent analysis, 
evaluating the problems that these relationships currently involve.  
Some of the empirical basis for this kind of approach already exists: Comparative 
studies of journalism, for example, have mapped how professional norms and ideals have 
evolved and differ across the world (e.g., Hanusch & Hanitzsch, 2017). In media policy 
studies, scholars have proposed that studying “social demand,” understood as the range of 
expectations that citizens have with respect to media, can be used as a basis for assessing the 
legitimacy of media and communication policies (Raboy, Abramson, Proulx, & Welters, 
2001). These empirical research findings, however, are not usually incorporated in normative 
theories of media freedom. The approach of normative reconstruction thus could provide a 
theoretical-normative horizon through which this empirical work would connect with 
normative theory and broader debates on freedom of communication and media freedom. 
Second, by historicizing and contextualizing the value of freedom of communication 
as a normative value, the normative-reconstructive approach is also better suited to explain 
when and how norms and values change and evolve. Rather than invoking an out-of-context 
quote from Enlightenment philosophers to assess current institutions, the approach would 
allow us to evaluate how current discourses of internet freedom, press freedom, or free 
speech perhaps entail conflicting norms, and how norms that have gained currency in one 
historical constellation may evolve, or perhaps lose their legitimacy, in another situation. 
Third, the holistic notion of social freedom also implies a critique of narrow legalistic 
and procedural conceptions of free speech. Beyond the individual legal right to free speech, it 
 takes into account the communicative practices and institutions that provide or fail to provide 
the conditions for individuals to make choices and express themselves. In the context of 
communication and media, this means taking into account broader structures of markets, 
democracy, family and personal relations, media use, and everyday life, in a more holistic, 
sociological view of freedom, which looks at how media systems provide various 
opportunities for individuals (see Couldry, 2010, pp. 66–67; Edge, 2013). 
Fully working out the implications of this approach for media and communication 
studies needs more development. The approach is also not without its problems. It can be 
questioned, for instance, how exactly researchers should evaluate and validate the actually 
existing norms without using any external ideal theories or principles that give critical 
distance from particular circumstances (see Wilson & Ryg, 2015, p. 137). Also, it can be 
argued that with its focus on existing values the approach also involves inherent 
conservatism, a bias towards the status quo, and the inability to imagine radically different 
alternatives to present conditions. Even with these problems, however, the approach of 
normative reconstruction offers one theoretical-framework that could potentially provide 
new, productive perspectives into current debates on free speech and media freedom as 
normative ideals. 
 
Communication as a Capability 
The capabilities approach, developed most prominently by Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum, provides another non-ideal normative framework for thinking about freedom of 
communication and expression. As a distinctive perspective on human rights and freedoms, 
the capabilities approach has received attention in several fields of social sciences, including 
welfare economics, social policy, development studies, and some contributions in media and 
communication studies (e.g. Couldry 2010; Garnham, 1997: Gelber, 2012; Kleine, 2013; 
 Schejter & Tirosh, 2016). However, as a broader framework of thinking about freedom of 
communication and media, the approach arguably remains underdeveloped in communication 
studies (Hesmondhalgh 2017). 
The capabilities approach proposes functional freedoms, or central human 
capabilities, as a normative starting point. The approach is often associated with the positive, 
or substantial, conception of freedom, because it is not concerned with absence of restrictions 
only, but with people’s real opportunities and their structural preconditions. As Sen (2009) 
argues, debates on human freedom should shift their focus from transcendental, procedural, 
and abstract ideals of authentic freedom to expanding the effective, real freedoms that people 
enjoy, or what people are actually able to do with the resources available.  
However, the idea of “real freedom” here does not refer to yet another ideal theory of 
a set of structures and institutions. Instead of advocating any predefined conception of what 
genuine, perfect freedom would look like under idealized conditions, the approach recognizes 
the multiple dimensions of freedom and the impossibility of its perfect realization. Instead, 
Sen has emphasized the incremental and practical achievements that expand people’s 
opportunities to pursue the objectives that they themselves value. According to Sen (2009, p. 
253) capabilities can thus be understood as the actual opportunities people have to achieve 
the things that they have good reason to value, and that are constitutive of their wellbeing. 
Instead of the procedural means to achieve various abstractly defined goals, the capability 
approach is concerned with the actual capability of individuals to achieve the desired end 
result. Emphasizing the importance of capabilities, rather than particular institutional 
arrangements or procedures, the capability approach offers an appealing normative 
framework that can be tailored to various different contexts.  
Although the implications of the approach have not been fully and systematically 
developed, its potential relevance for media and communication studies has been 
 acknowledged (e.g. Hesmondhalgh, 2017). In the context of communication, the most 
obvious implication of the approach is that it rejects the formal, procedural focus of much 
free speech thinking, and instead focuses on the distribution of social resources that enable or 
constrain individuals’ communicative capabilities. As Nicholas Garnham (1997, p. 121) puts 
it in one of the first discussions of the applications of the capabilities approach for 
communication studies, “we need to think of newspapers and broadcasting as enablers of a 
range of functionings rather than as providers of a stream of content to be consumed.” Today, 
the rise of digital platforms and intermediaries arguably make this perspective even more 
significant. Digital intermediaries and platforms, which increasingly exert structural, 
algorithmic power that shapes the options and opportunities available to media users, 
challenge the old conceptual frameworks of “free press” and “censorship.” The capabilities 
perspective provides a normative lens through which various factors, such as technological 
affordances, market structures and regulations, can both enable or constrain communicative 
capabilities and functionings. As Hesmondhalgh (2017, p. 213) notes, it allows debate about 
constraints on what media users do with the opportunities presented to them and what 
economic, social and cultural factors may stop them from using media and communication 
resources to achieve functionings that they have reason to value. 
Another key implication of the capability approach for communication is that as a 
normative framework it is comparative. Sen emphasizes the need to normatively compare 
different options within the feasible set, rather than a transcendental approach, which 
involves assessing those options in the light of an ideal theory generated under idealized 
assumptions. Accordingly, one of the most prominent policy uses of the approach is in the 
development of comparative country rankings, such as the Human Development Index 
(HDI). Similarly in the context of communication and media freedom, the capability 
approach could have much to offer as a normative basis for comparisons between countries, 
 media systems, or platforms – and the relative effective freedom they enable – without the 
necessity of having an ideal theory of perfect freedom. The capabilities approach thus 
provides a useful framework for comparative work on how different media systems or 
policies promote people’s real communicative opportunities, or for studying communicative 
inequalities with regard to access or voice between individuals or groups within societies. 
While theoretically and normatively attractive, the operationalization of the approach 
is not without its problems. The problem of how to identify and select the relevant 
capabilities or functionings to compare and with what criteria their realization can be 
assessed through remains, especially in the context of media and communication 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2017; Moss, 2018). What are the basic communicative capabilities that most 
people would have reason to value? 
Sen himself has not wanted to specify any authoritative list of basic capabilities or 
their criteria. He has argued against “one pre-determined canonical list of capabilities, chosen 
by theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning” (Sen, 2005, p. 158). 
Others, most notably Martha Nussbaum, have taken the approach in a more substantive 
direction, arguing that to be useful as more than a theoretical outline, we need to identify 
what are the basic capabilities that we should aim for all humans to have. In contrast to Sen’s 
more open-ended approach, Nussbaum has consequently developed a list of central, basic 
capabilities that all democracies have the responsibility to guarantee to citizens. For 
Nussbaum (2000, 2011), these cover areas including: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; 
senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; 
and control over one’s environment. Among these, it is easy to recognize several issues 
related to communication and expression (see also Hesmondhalgh, 2017, pp. 213–214), 
including for instance, the ability “to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do 
these things in a ‘truly human’ way […] informed and cultivated by an adequate education”; 
 “being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing 
works and events of one’s own choice” and “being able to use one’s mind in ways protected 
by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech” 
(Nussbaum, 2000, p. 78). 
Similarly to Honneth (2014), and his emphasis on institutional settings and structural 
preconditions, Nussbaum emphasizes the role of public policy in promoting the educational, 
institutional, and material conditions for the realization of basic capabilities. It is in this way 
that Couldry (2010) has also drawn on the capabilities approach to argue for treating voice, 
the effective ability to give an account of oneself, as a fundamental capability, and for 
evaluating institutional frameworks and the allocation of resources on the basis of how they 
enable this in practice.  
Access to information and communicative resources can also be seen as having an 
important, facilitative role in the realization of other basic capabilities (Gelber, 2012). We can 
think of digital capabilities, such as internet access, as an enabling capability, which makes 
people aware of their other rights, helps them participate in society, and contributes to 
wellbeing in other ways. In this way, adopting the capabilities approach as a normative 
framework could also help integrate debates on communication rights and freedoms with 
other human rights and social justice issues. 
Since theorists of the capability approach have so far had relatively little to say about 
communication or media more concretely, more work is needed to develop the framework for 
the purposes of theorizing or operationalizing communicative freedom. Beyond general 
values, such as having a voice, the substance of what basic communicative capabilities would 
entail in different contexts thus remains an open question to be discussed (see, Moss, 2018). 
Beyond its empirical uses and questions of operationalization, however, the capabilities 
approach could, above all, have much more to offer to communication as another, non-ideal 
 normative framework that provides a language and concepts for talking about communicative 
rights and freedoms, not as an either/or state of affairs or an idealized first-principle, but as a 
matter of degree, constrained by several institutional factors. 
 
Agonistic Freedom 
A third, distinct theoretical perspective that emphasizes the contested and partial 
nature of freedom can be found in the radical or “agonistic” theories of democracy, promoted 
by political theorists such as Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005). While these theories share the 
previous two perspectives’ criticism of the abstract proceduralism of conventional liberal 
theories, the radical democratic theories put even more emphasis on the constrained nature of 
freedom and identifying and challenging the hegemonic power relations that always shape 
communication. 
The central claim of this perspective is that not only the liberal model of the 
marketplace of ideas but also ideal conceptions of a rational and deliberative public sphere 
fail to sufficiently address the inevitable nature of power and existing forms of exclusion. As 
a consequence of emphasizing the ineradicable nature of hegemonic power relations, the aim 
of promoting freedom of communication from the radical-democratic perspective is not the 
complete elimination of power relations but their continuing contestation. Instead of 
imagining ideal models of absolute freedom, the point is to make seemingly neutral power 
structures and constraints visible so they can be challenged and reformed. As Mouffe (2005, 
p. 51) argues, “without grasping the structure of the current hegemonic order and the type of 
power relations through which it is constituted, no real democratisation can ever get off the 
ground.” 
Even more so than Honneth or Sen, post-foundational theorists like Mouffe treat 
ideals of authentic freedom as not only empirically unattainable but also ontologically 
 impossible. In terms of communication and free expression, the basic premise of this 
approach is captured in Stanley Fish’s (1994) famous argument that “there is no such thing as 
free speech.” Fish’s point is that assertions of free speech have never been general, as they 
are always articulated against the background of restrictions and exclusions that give the 
concept its meaning. In this sense, relations of power, and the various exclusions and 
restrictions they impose, are constitutive of public expression. From this perspective, notions 
like free speech and media freedom are thus understood above all as terms rooted in certain 
historical practices, institutional arrangements, and privileges that they protect. According to 
Wendy Brown (1995, p. 6), “freedom is neither a philosophical absolute nor a tangible entity 
but a relational and contextual practice that takes shape in opposition to whatever is locally 
and ideologically conceived as unfreedom.” 
Such radical anti-foundationalism may not at first glance seem like a very sustainable 
basis for defending or promoting communicative freedom. Postmodern and poststructuralist 
approaches are easy to criticize for extreme relativism and subjectivism that abandons all 
principles, allowing the notion of freedom to be used for any purpose by anyone. On the other 
hand, in contrast to the absolute and universalizing rhetoric, a position that recognizes the 
contextual and limited nature of freedom can also be seen as a more tenable and empowering 
basis for expanding and reimagining communicative freedom as a normative value under 
present conditions. 
This argument has recently been made by philosopher Kostas Kioupkiolis (2008, 
2009, 2012). Drawing on thinkers like Cornelius Castoriadis and Michel Foucault, 
Kioupkiolis criticizes the conventional, modern conceptions of freedom for essentialism, 
tying freedom to unchanging universal laws and definite conditions of realization, and for 
failing to address the constrained nature of human agency. For him, conceptualizing freedom 
as the absence of external constraints, such as state censorship, and the assumption that 
 people are as free as they can be if only there is no outside intervention, affords no insight 
into how we can actually go about expanding freedom. 
In contrast, Kioupkiolis (2008, p. 153) argues for an agonistic conception of freedom, 
understood as a “limited process of struggle against a multiplicity of constraints, which 
cannot be fully eradicated.” Following Foucault, this approach emphasizes that the multiple 
constraints that structure human behavior are simultaneously enabling and restraining, and 
cannot be entirely wiped out. Instead, when the inherently constrained nature of freedom is 
recognized, “freedom breaks loose from the compulsion to achieve its definite realization 
within fixed social conditions and particular institutional arrangements” (Kioupkiolis, 2009, 
p. 474). Accordingly, the agonistic conception of freedom and its heightened appreciation of 
contingency can enhance creative agency and innovation: projecting new objects and ways of 
living, allowing individuals to bring new possibilities into existence, and extending the range 
of political options beyond any predefined alternatives (Kioupkiolis, 2009, p. 484). Similarly, 
radical-democratic theorists like Mouffe (2000, pp. 33–34) have emphasized that, while 
concepts such as democracy and freedom are always indeterminate and open to a multitude of 
interpretations, it is the role of critical research itself to offer these interpretations, and thus 
provide a basis for real political alternatives. 
If some non-ideal approaches, such as Honneth’s normative reconstruction, can be 
criticized for inherent bias in favor of the status quo and existing institutions, then agonistic 
freedom may invite criticism on the opposite grounds. In terms of concrete implications, its 
emphasis on the processes of contestation, resistance, and criticism makes it susceptible to 
the criticism that it is obsessed only with disruption, and incapable of developing any 
substantive normative positions or concrete institutional suggestions. 
The agonistic approach does not have to mean mere valorization of disruption, and it 
has also been used in critical media policy research as a normative perspective for evaluating 
 institutional structures and media policies (Karppinen, 2007). In some ways, however, it is 
clear that the agonistic approach is above all a call to recognize the aspects of power, 
exclusion, and control inherent in all conceptions of free communication, more than an 
attempt to defend any particular definition of freedom or its institutional preconditions. 
Public communication is always subject to a range of constraints and limitations, ranging 
from individuals’ skills and access to market logics, cultural conventions, and other structural 
forms of social control. Especially in the context of contemporary media, many of these 
constraints to free communication are novel, under-studied, and not easily observed. 
Therefore, making visible the operation of power relations and the constraints they pose can 
itself be a valuable contribution, as an antidote to the simple dichotomies of freedom/control 
that often frame debates on issues like media freedom or internet freedom. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on extending the range of options and imagining political alternatives beyond the 
existing institutional settings is highly relevant to contemporary debates on digital politics 
and policy. 
 
Conclusions 
In line with broader critiques of ideal theory in political philosophy, there is 
continuing frustration in communication studies with idealizing discourses around freedom of 
communication and media.  On the one hand, philosophical ideals of free speech can appear 
too detached from the actual functioning of contemporary media institutions and platforms of 
communication to offer much guidance. On the other hand, debates on freedom of 
expression, communication, and media are also riddled with politically instrumentalist and 
theoretically vacuous uses that try to summon the perceived sacrosanct and absolute nature of 
these principles for a variety of political agendas.  
 I have argued in this article that there is a need for new normative and theoretical 
perspectives to guide debates on freedom of communication and media. The article presents 
three distinct non-ideal, non-foundational perspectives, which can arguably help 
conceptualize problems related to freedom of communication in the context of current non-
ideal circumstances in a more realistic way than some of the ideal models inherited from 
classic ideal theories of communication studies. 
This is not to argue that ideal normative theories have no place at all: among other 
functions, they can still provide philosophical justifications and analyses of the nature and 
properties of normative concepts, and may even serve practical political functions by 
providing a vision of an ideal society, or by drawing attention to the urgency of current 
societal problems in light of these ideals (e.g., Stemplowska & Swift, 2012). The distinction 
between idealizing and non-idealizing approaches also need not be exaggerated: their 
perspectives can complement as well as compete. The purpose of the article is not to 
denounce the value of ideal theories, nor do I suggest that the frameworks presented above 
provide the be-all and end-all of thinking about freedom of communication.  
The three frameworks are illustrative, not exhaustive, and they are presented for the 
purpose of broadening the theoretical horizons of media studies, and opening up dialogue 
between communication studies and broader social and political theory (see Hesmondhalgh 
& Toynbee, 2008). When it comes to comparing the three approaches, or evaluating their 
respective value as a theoretical resource for rethinking freedom of communication, the three 
approaches described here can be seen as all having specific areas of application: Honneth’s 
normative reconstruction provides a way for historicizing freedom of communication and 
media as a social value. As a values that has emerged and evolved in specific institutional and 
cultural contexts, it should be analyzed socially, in relation to these expectations and 
promises. The capabilities approach, on the other hand, offers a normative framework that is 
 already established in many other fields. It can be employed, for example, in comparisons of 
how different institutional contexts or media policies enable or constrain people’s 
communicative opportunities. Finally, the perspective of agonistic freedom operates above all 
as a critical perspective that seeks to make the relations of power that constrain 
communication visible and that can expand our imaginaries by opening up new “counter-
hegemonic” alternatives and political options. 
The three different theoretical approaches outlined above also represent very different 
strands of thinking, each of which comes with its own problems and requires more 
development in the context of media and communication. Their common implication, 
however, is that freedom of communication should not be understood as an absolute, 
foundational ideal, or a state of affairs that can be unambiguously achieved, but more as a 
matter of degree, subject to a range of empirical constraints and limits. These constraints can 
be based on state, market, or technological systems, and cultural, political, and social 
relations of power. The existence of these constraints is not to be seen only as a deviation 
from the ideal model, but as a starting point that critical research aims to analyze, make 
visible, and modify.  
These non-ideal approaches can also be seen as broadly pragmatic in their goals. They 
all emphasize a continual process of critical engagement with the existing structures that 
enable and constrain freedom. To different degrees, they also focus on conducting normative 
theory in close engagement with empirical research. Instead of attempting to develop an 
institutional blueprint for free media or communications systems from purely abstract 
principles, they all emphasize that normative theory requires empirical input and awareness 
of how real-life, non-ideal media institutions and practices actually work and what types of 
emergent constraints they pose (cf. Mills, 2005, p. 178). 
 Abandoning universal principles and ideal theories is often criticized for relativism 
and subjectivism that makes it impossible to make objective normative judgements or 
evaluations. Yet, all of these perspectives are also critical and normative. As normative 
perspectives, they imply different methods and strategies: evaluating the validity of existing 
institutional promises of freedom, comparing the capabilities afforded by different 
institutional settings, and making existing constraints and structures of power visible. As 
conceptual resources for assessing media systems, building hypotheses, and asking new 
questions, they all offer conceptual resources to guide critical research into the contemporary 
media landscape, and the multitude of structural, behavioral, and cultural factors that enable 
and constrain freedom of communication. 
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